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1 Introduction
In common with most other important philosophical topics, no settled con-
sensus has emerged regarding the correct understanding of probability. Views
that take probabilities to be relative frequencies, or degrees of belief, or ir-
reducible chancy properties of systems remain viable, but none is without
serious problems. One division that remains resilient is that between subjec-
tivist and objectivist views of probability. Subjectivist views locate the facts
that underlie true probability ascriptions within epistemic agents; objectivist
views locate those facts out ‘in the world’.
Richard Johns’ A Theory of Physical Probability 1 is a welcome further contri-
bution to this literature. Johns presents a novel approach, the “causal theory
of chance”, which purports to give an objectivist account of physical prob-
ability, or chance. But as we shall see, he does so in a way that blurs the
boundaries between objectivist and subjectivist views.
The book has two main parts. The first part (Chapters 2–4) develops a sus-
tained account of Johns’ own view of chance. The second part (Chapters 5–7)
applies the view to some outstanding problems in understanding probability
in classical statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. Johns’ approach is
bold, and his choice of topics to cover is nothing if not ambitious. In the second
part alone he proposes accounts of the direction of time (§5.7), the measure-
ment problem and the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (§§7.2–7.3), and
Email address: aeagle@princeton.edu (Antony Eagle).
1 All otherwise unattributed references are to this book. Some notation has been
altered.
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the fundamental connection between physical facts and states of knowledge
(§7.3.4). Despite the interest of the intriguing claims Johns defends in these
chapters, I will concentrate on the positive account of physical probability in
the first part. Unfortunately we shall find sufficient there to trouble us.
2 The Causal Theory of Chance
The task Johns sets himself is to provide an interpretation of probability as-
criptions in scientific theories that gives those ascriptions an objective ground
in the physical properties of the systems those theories describe. Moreover,
to be an adequate explication of the concept of probability, the resulting in-
terpretation should show how this physical probability can constrain rational
credence, can be uncovered in frequency data, and be defined in the single
case. He claims, quite correctly, that no existing interpretation satisfies all
these requirements, and proceeds to give his own account.
He dubs his view the causal theory of chance, and maintains that “the chance
of an event is the degree to which it is determined by its cause” (p. 4). From
this characterisation it is immediate that Johns must give us account of de-
termination and causation, and an account of partial determination.
2.1 Causation and Determination
In fact, Johns gives no analysis of causation, but is content with a quasi-
Aristotelian notion of an efficient cause: “an efficient cause brings about, or
produces, its effect” (p. 54), and “supports the real existence of the effect”
(p. 58). Causation cannot be analysed, says Johns, because causation is es-
sentially a relation between actual existent events, and cannot be captured
by a logical relation, which can only relate abstract representations of actual
existents. Johns thinks this is a very general problem: any existent entity has
some ‘concreteness’ which outstrips the content of facts involving those en-
tities, and hence outstrips the capacity of the understanding (§3.3.5). Even
setting aside the mysterious role of ‘concreteness’, I find this argument puz-
zling at best. I don’t see how it counts against any of the actual proposals
we have for analysing causation—for instance, a counterfactual analysis of ‘a
causes b’ is that the proposition true just when b occurs counterfactually de-
pends on the proposition true just when a occurs (Lewis, 1973). This analysis
holds between actual events, yet whether there is causation or not depends on
the logical properties of those events. There doesn’t seem to be any tension
here. Furthermore, any account of causation like Johns’ that restricts itself
to actual events will have trouble with the fact that causal claims support
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counterfactual claims.
On the other hand, Johns has no problem giving an analysis of determination:
the proposition C determines the proposition E just if, given the laws L, C
entails E.
Johns has a very particular concept in mind when he speaks of laws—what
he calls a dynamical nature (§3.2.2). He introduces this through a discussion
of the Lagrangian formulation of Newtonian mechanics, in particular how this
formulation emphasises the role of an internal parameter of the system (the
lagrangian) in determining the trajectory of the parts, rather than emphasis-
ing external gravitational forces. Johns then claims that “the lagrangian of
a system X. . . may be viewed as a representation of X’s dynamical nature”
(p. 67). This is supposed to be an intrinsic property that regulates the “natural
motion” of the system, once the background conditions bcX are specified.
However, contemporary physics is skeptical of teleological notions, and even
if a system can be described as if it had some internal constraint on its nat-
ural motion, that doesn’t establish that there is such a constraint. This is
particularly relevant in this case, since the one instance he provides of such a
constraint, the lagrangian of classical systems, has no analogue in stochastic
systems. His response to this is simply to state that “it is one of the main the-
oretical claims of this book that every system has a generalized lagrangian”
(p. 68). By ‘theoretical claim’ one can only understand Johns to mean ‘meta-
physical posit’, and I think we can be rightfully skeptical of this kind of bap-
tism in absentia of some physical property as the teleological ground of dynam-
ical laws. I take this to be an instance of what van Fraassen (1989, pp. 38–9)
calls “the identification problem”: without an account of just how the dynam-
ical nature is related to familiar physical properties, the account of laws is
empty.
2.2 Partial Determination and Logical Probability
Johns proceeds to argue that we can have causation without determination,
and though he proposes an extremely curious argument (§3.3.5), I take it
that almost all contemporary accounts of causation are compatible with this
possibility. Where he does diverge from the mainstream is in maintaining that
nevertheless causes determine their effects to a certain degree, by which he
means that causes partially entail their effects.
In Chapter 2, Johns gives an account of this partial entailment relation as a
species of logical probability. Ever since philosophers became convinced of the
failure of Carnap’s programme 1962, purely a priori determination of empirical
probabilities has been widely regarded as a fantasy, so it is interesting to
3
examine how Johns proposes to resurrect the notion. 2 He begins by looking
at the nature of logic, and argues that the correct view of logic is that of
Ga¨rdenfors (1988, esp. ch. 6): logic is the study of the epistemic dynamics
of idealised cognitive agents. The content of an epistemic input is a function
that describes how that input alters the epistemic state of the agent, and each
such function is identified with a proposition. Ga¨rdenfors shows how these
function-propositions have a group theoretic structure that is isomorphic to
the intuitionistic propositional calculus. Ga¨rdenfors sees the construction as
showing how to model entailment without an ontology of possible worlds,
utilising rather less controversial belief states.
Johns has an altogether more radical take on his very similar construction: he
thinks one can construct states of affairs and possible worlds out of the con-
tents of belief state changes. He therefore requires that the idealised epistemic
states in question be more ‘objective’ than idealised human states would be.
He posits the existence of
a perfect, infinite intellect, a mind of unlimited capacity that infallibly draws
all and only valid inferences. This mind is an embodiment of all logical truth.
I assume that the Gedanken of this being are (or are indistinguishable from)
states of affairs themselves. . . For this reason, I will treat states of affairs as
components of epistemic states, and definable from epistemic states, rather
than as separate entities. (p. 20–1).
Resisting the urge to stare incredulously, I will point out that if we are to follow
Ga¨rdenfors’ construction, there need to be many possible epistemic states of
this infinite mind, enough to distinguish all the possible propositions. This
“infinite intellect” is not therefore unique—there is one abstract entity for
each maximal state of affairs (though sometimes it seems that Johns means to
claim that this actual world is just the epistemic state of the one actual infinite
intellect.) Note also that any a priori truth (true in any epistemic state) will
turn out a logical truth on this account: but we might baulk at “I am here
now” (Kaplan, 1989).
Johns then proceeds to give an account of the internal structure of these ideal
epistemic states, and adapts the Ramsey-de Finetti theorem to show that the
structure is a subjective probability function. 3 This requires that the infinite
intellect not just have epistemic states but also desires and preferences. Johns’
only argument for this claim is the rhetorical question “If this being has beliefs,
then why not desires as well?” (p. 29). One reason why not is that, unlike
epistemic states whose standard of correctness is the actual state of affairs,
desire states are not thought to be directed at any objectively correct standard.
2 For a recent attempt to partially resurrect Carnap’s project see Fitelson (forth-
coming).
3 Ramsey (1990); de Finetti (1964); Jeffrey (1983).
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Therefore for any given epistemic state there is a plurality of compatible desire
functions. If Johns wants a unique assignment, he needs something like a
unique objectively determined assignment of utiles to any state of affairs.
This is surely a chimera.
If we grant Johns this unique ‘logical’ preference ordering, he can use a vari-
ant Dutch-book argument to show that there is a belief-desire pair that can
yield the correct ‘logical’ probability function Pr. 4 Johns introduces a nice
characterisation of conditional probabilities in terms of relative probabilities
(§2.5), and advocates the appealing view that conditional probability is the
more basic notion. 5
Johns obliquely recognises the problem of non-uniqueness of the logical prob-
ability function, and in §2.6 makes the claim that often logical probabilities
will be interval-valued rather than perfectly precise. As best I can see, how-
ever, the intervals for every logically contingent proposition will be totally
vague: just [0, 1]. If one imagines supervaluating over all the possible ideal
epistemic/desire states, then since the epistemic content of a state places no
constraint on the desirabilities associated with it, there is nothing to limit the
credence to a particular region of the unit interval given the preferences and
desires. Of course we can fall back to the position where there is stipulated
to be a unique logical preference ordering. It is no surprise that if we assume
this much we can get a substantial account of logical probability: it has all the
advantages of theft over honest toil.
Johns also discusses (§2.7) the traditional companion of purely a priori prob-
abilities, the Principle of Indifference (POI). 6 The POI states that equal
probability should be assigned to equally possible cases. He proposes a new
symmetry-based version of a POI: if in an epistemic state two mutually exclu-
sive states of affairs are unable to “be singled out from” each other (Def. 2.7.8),
they should be assigned equal probability. My best stab at understanding the
metaphor of ‘singling out’ is that given the content of some epistemic state K,
two distinct propositions A and B induce a shift to the same augmented epis-
temic state K∗ and hence have no distinguishable content—though relative to
another state K ′, those propositions would have different content. Naturally
enough, this kind of symmetry is extremely difficult to achieve, and this sup-
ports Johns’ contention that his POI is immune to the paradoxes that have
4 He claims it is not a Dutch book argument: but the only way I can see to justify
the constraints on the valuation function is that an agent who was rational wouldn’t
have a valuation function that violated those constraints—Lemma 2.4.4 in particular
can only be justified by a rationality constraint that a proposition believed with
certainty is worth the yield of any contract on it.
5 See also Ha´jek (forthcoming).
6 For details on the problems with logical probability and POI see van Fraassen
(1989, ch. 12).
5
plagued previous efforts. All of the paradoxical situations fail to be symmet-
rical in Johns’ sense, and hence the POI cannot be applied to get conflicting
results. This is a neat result.
2.3 Chance
We are now in a position to state Johns’ own view. The chance PX of an event
A in a system X which has dynamical nature LX and background condition
bcX is (Def. 4.1.1):
PX(A) =df Pr(A|LX ∧ bcX). (1)
That is, the chance of an event is the degree to which the laws and the contin-
gent background constraints entail the proposition that the event occurs. It is
a causal theory because the concrete entities that the propositions LX and bcX
describe are supposed to be the efficient causes of the event that A describes,
and that partially determine the event to the degree PX(A)—their status as
causes justifies their inclusion in the conditioning events for the chance func-
tion. Though this is an objective account of physical chance, the reason for
thinking that it blurs the line between subjective and objective views is clear:
states of affairs like LX and bcX are idealised epistemic entities for Johns, as
is the logical probability function Pr. (Perhaps this would be better called a
Berkeleyan or idealist theory of chance.)
I think Johns is right to explicitly include the system X in the consideration
of the chances, rather than only the entire best theory of chances. There is
no chance of any event simpliciter, but only relative to the particular system
that event is taken to be embedded in. Though there remains a problem about
interpreting our assertions of unconditional chance and our acting on uncondi-
tional credence, taking this position that conditional probability is basic solves
a number of problems with chance (Ha´jek, 2003).
The proposal is quite similar to at least one formulation of the Principal
Principle (Lewis, 1980): that the chance of A is the reasonable credence one
would have in A given the history of a world up until some time, and the
theory of chance for that world. 7 Johns (§4.3) argues that his approach is
superior in two ways: firstly, the logical probability function Pr replaces the
‘reasonable initial credence’; and secondly the dynamical nature LX makes
no mention of chances or modalities, unlike the ‘complete theory of chance’,
and hence avoids the risk of circularity. However it seems to me that Johns
7 Indeed, Johns argues that the Principal Principle (or as he calls it, Miller’s Prin-
ciple) is provable as a theorem (§4.4).
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does not avoid these difficulties. The appeal to logical probability doesn’t
yield a unique probability function if my arguments above are successful, and
so doesn’t remove any of the subjectivity or arbitrariness of the reasonable
initial credence function. Moreover, the symmetry constraints Johns places on
the ideal epistemic states are too weak to narrow the class of possible chance
functions down substantially, and any stronger symmetry constraint looks to
lead to paradox.
Again, if the dynamical nature LX is to mention no modal facts, then that
makes LX a fact about the actual system X. But this makes it impossible to
see how LX could support modal properties except as brute fact introduced
as a metaphysical posit (Johns resists Lewis’ demand that the correct theory
of chance should be a Humean theory). To understand what chance is, it is
not enough to know only that it constrains rational credence via the Principal
Principle. Humean quantities (like frequencies) we have some independent
means of accessing, but an appeal to LX, in common with other metaphysical
solutions to the problem of chance (like propensities), cannot explain why
chance should have the role that it does. Johns makes some attempt to address
these worries in his discussion of direct and inverse inference (§4.6), but since
his account presupposes the truth of the Principal Principle it cannot address
this issue of empirical access to chances.
3 Conclusion
As must be obvious, I cannot agree with Johns’ account of physical probability:
I find the premises unacceptable. I suspect that, for the same reason, few others
will find the view appealing. I have tried above to give several arguments that
lead to what I consider to be deep problems for his view, but the book has
other unappealing features.
Occasionally a deeper engagement with the relevant literature would have been
desirable, despite the fact that Johns’ primary concern is to propose a positive
view. For example, the omission of Earman (1986) from the discussion of
determinism (§§3.2–3.3) is quite striking, and leads to a number of confusions
about determinism and prediction. 8
This flaw is compounded by the extraordinarily broad scope of Johns’ ambi-
tion, as often the argument proceeds at a very rapid pace and makes assump-
tions that have been quite controversial in the literature. The discussions of
8 The exclusively Fregean focus of the material on propositions in §2.1 is another
example: one would have thought no contemporary discussion of ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ could omit reference to Kripke (1980).
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model-theoretic accounts of entailment (p. 20), of the metaphysics of modality
(§3.3.6) and of the problems of direct and inverse inference (§4.6) are partic-
ularly blatant examples, along with several issues I discussed in more detail
above. When combined with occasional loose usage of important terms (e.g.,
‘maximal’ used in two different senses on p. 22, and the persistent (deliberate?)
confusion of states of affairs with descriptions of states of affairs throughout
Chapters 3 and 4), the persuasiveness of the arguments is substantially im-
paired.
The book is novel, clearly written and technically able, and Johns proposes
some very interesting ideas, but as a result of the foregoing problems I cannot
recommend the book. The arguments proposed, while interesting, all too often
depend on claims that careful readers will find it difficult to accept.
This is particularly unfortunate because many will find the broad outlines of
the view very appealing. Johns’ assessment of the demands that any acceptable
theory of probability should meet is quite compelling. I agree that a view which
recognises the fundamental importance of the modal aspect of probability and
its dependence on acceptable physical theory can give the best account of these
constraints on physical probability. I also concur in Johns’ assessment that
connecting chance with credence through principles of probability coordination
like the Principal Principle is the best way to understand the empirical content
of probabilistic theories, particularly in the single case. But similar existing
accounts (Lewis, 1980; Levi, 1990) have less controversial foundations and
make the case for the approach more effectively. It is a pity that Johns’ book
as a whole doesn’t quite live up to the promise that parts of it clearly display.
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